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Abstract 
This study aims to test whether the media used can predict the individual's tendency to collaborate (cooperatively) 
or compete in the negotiation process, and whether the use of certain media affects the maximum joint payoff of 
the negotiation process. This research is expected to contribute theoretically to the development of concepts 
concerning media richness and electronic negotiations as well as prisoner's dilemma games. This study uses an 
experimental design to explain the tendencies of collaboration and competition by using Prisoner's Dilemma 
Games. The participants are students from management programs at two universities in Indonesia.  There are 
some limitations in this article, namely, the research model still has limitations in explaining the behavior of 
negotiators in making decisions, especially on negotiations with computer media. In fact, the use of computer 
media in negotiations encounters a number of geographic constraints, ie distance and time differences which 
may greatly affect the outcome of negotiations under different conditions of the study.  
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1. Introduction 
The basic needs of organizations is the ability to communicate. Members communicate with each other with the 
Member organizations as well as individuals outside the organization to achieve their goals. There are many 
available media to support the communication needs such as face-to-face, written document, and the newer 
forms of communication such as voice mail and video teleconferencing.  
Research results indicate that communication media have a significant impact on negotiations. Negotiation 
is a form of social interaction that seeks to make joint decision issues. The ability of negotiators to effective 
communications crucial to successful negotiation.  
One of the most widely applied theories on media usage is the theory of media wealth. This theory suggests 
that accomplishing of tasks will increase as the task requirements match the media’s ability to convey 
information (Daft and Lengel, 1986). They conclude that information-rich media such as face-to-face is better 
suited for a kind of equivocality, whereas less rich media (e.g. email) are suitable for uncertainty. On a vague 
task where there are multiple interpretations of available information, whereas on the types of uncertain tasks 
there is a lack of information.  
The theory of media richness will get on the assumption that increased media wealth was associated with 
increased social or physical presence (Zmud et al, 1990). Although the ability of the communication medium is 
important to support the various communication processes that occur in a face-to-face context, there appears will 
other dimensions will suppose important to consider. A number of new computer-facilitated innovations (such as 
email, group support systems, voice mail, video teleconferencing) emerged after  developing media richness 
theory, but this was not a significant problem due to newer electronic media such as audio and Videos have 
entered and fit with the media richness theory (El-Shinnawy and Markus, 1992).  
Purdy (2000) in a study examining the impact of medium on the negotiation outcomes of concluded that the 
communication medium used for negotiation will choose with carefull. The communication medium determines 
how much negotiators access to perceptions and communication cues affecting the semantic, syntax and style of 
the negotiator (Fulk et al, 1990). This study aims to decide the ability of communication media used in 
predicting the tendency of people to act cooperatively or competitively.  
This study aims to test whether the media used can predict the individual's tendency to collaborate 
(cooperatively) or compete in the negotiation process, and whether the use of certain media affects the maximum 
joint payoff of the negotiation process. 
 
2. Literature studies and hypotheses development 
2.1. Media Richness Theory 
Media Richness Theory (MRT) was first introduced by Daft and Lengel (1986) to answer the question of why 
organizations are processing, and they proposed a conceptual framework for sorting communication media from 
richest to leanest. The richness order of the various communication media is fixed and independent of the 
individual and organizational context in which the communication medium is used.  
Media Richness Theory argues that technology collaboration varies from the media’s richness side. Media 
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richness is ability of the medium to alter understanding within a given time interval. There are 4 factors that 
influence the richness of a medium that is 1) the ability of the medium to transmit cues, 2) the proximity of 
feedback, 3) variation of language and 4) personal focus on technology.  
Media Richness Theory views media communications based on the media’s ability to convey information. 
An relate with media richness theory, Sitkin, Sutcliffe, and Barrios-Choplin (in Minsky & Marin, 1999) mention 
there are two components of media wealth determinants, namely the ability to convey information and the ability 
to convey information about individual carriers of information. Thus, the focus of the media richness theory is on 
the ability of medium to provide feedback, non verbal cues, preserving the integrity of messages, and presenting 
emotional expressions. Based on these criteria, media wealth theory put face to face communication as the 
richest media, followed by video conferencing, synchronous audio (phone), text-based chat, asynchronous audio 
/ email, and threaded discussion.  
Testing of this theory is mostly done to check the suitability of media, not on the actual effects of media use 
(Rice, 1992). Usually managers are asked to select the media to be used to send a set of hypotheses to determine 
whether their choices match the predictions of media wealth theory (Daft and Lengel, 1988). The results of these 
studies are not entirely convincing. In some cases, managers have obtained different results than those predicted 
by media richness theory (Carnevale, 1981).  
Previous studies have compared the impact of different uses of communication media. These studies show 
that media can affect the nature of communication, but that certain effects depend on the type of task (Reder and 
Concklin, 1987). For some tasks there is no difference due to media usage, but for other tasks there is a dramatic 
difference.  
Mark (1994) conducted a number of empirical studies related to media wealth theory. But precisely the 
results of research given contrary to the theory. The conclusion is that the use of some communication media is 
inconsistent with media wealth theory. This is reinforced by other studies that provide the same conclusion. As a 
result of this opinion came to reject the idea that richness communication is invariant, and only as a property of 
the communication media itself.  
Some authors have conducted CMC experiments to test a wealth of technical information on behavior. 
Jansen et.al (1999) found significant differences between the various forms of communication (i.e. text chat, 
text-to-speech and voice) with voice communication at the highest level of coöperation. Brosig et.al (2002) 
found evidence that cooperative levels were much higher in video and table conferences compared with other 
treatments (other collaboration media) such as audio conferences, lectures and talk shows. 
 
2.2. Computer-mediated communication 
There is a very rapid increase in the number of organizations and people who use media for communication such 
as computer mediated communication (CMC) (Hunt, 1999). The use of new technologies such as computer chat 
and video conferencing increases. Negotiators must choose or use various technologies without knowing the 
impact of those choices.  
Initial research on the role of CMC shows that non-face-to-face communication is inherent and will inhibit 
develop interpersonal relationships, including the form of relationships between business partners after the 
negotiation. The research argument is that CMC eliminates vocal cues and facial expressions of negotiators that 
are important in building a relationship. CMC does not accommodate the social relations processes that occur 
during face-to-face negotiations (Culnan and Mark, 1987). Similar results are found in the negotiation literature 
that negotiators who do not see partners are more contemporary (contradictory) and less cooperative. Thus 
miscommunication will occur more often in email usage than telephone communications. 
Rice and Love (1987) argue that CMCs can not be compared with face-to-face interactions. The argument is 
that CMCs are not suitable for negotiation or to persuade others, because of the limited CMC capabilities of the 
audio and visual cues present in the interaction. Therefore, they argue that CMC interactions contain only a small 
amount of socioemotional content.  
Although the study of communication competence is still being debated (McCroskey, 1982, Rubin et al, 
1993, Wieman, 1977), everyone agrees that communication competence is a very important part of a healthy 
communication relationship (Wrench et al., 2007). DeSannctis and Monge (1999) suggest that CMC is more 
effective than face-to-face communication for divergent tasks. Divergent tasks are tasks that need creative ideas 
by exploiting many possible solutions. Whereas face-to-face communication is more compelling for concurrent 
errands such as decision-making that require interdependency on others. Archee (1993) found evidence that face-
to-face groups were better at making decisions from the CMC group because face-to-face groups were more 
likely to reach agreement at the same time using either verbal or non-verbal responses at a time, while the CMC 
group was slower in Giving non-verbal feedback as well as uncertainty in expressing their reactions. Strans and 
Grath (1994) also argue that face-to-face communication is superior to CMC especially for tasks that need high 
interdependence. Biccheri et al. (2007) found evidence that the impact of communication varied by wealth or 
communication channel. Videoconference produces a very close level of coöperation with Face-to-face 
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communication, while text-based communication results in less substantive coöperation. Generally the impact of 
CMC approaches the impact of face-to-face communication because CMC is a communication channel that 
produces face-to-face communication features. 
 
2.3. Negotiation theory 
An important paradigm that underlies behavioral analysis in negotiations is that individuals behave according to 
their motivations. Thus developed a motivational orientation that guides and strategies that guide individual 
behavior in resolving conflict (Kilman and Thomas, 1977). The study of motivation orientation was initiated by 
Deutsch (1949) which states that managers should analyze the forces of conflict based on two axes: focus on 
self-interest or focus on the interests of others. Dual concern model shows 5 conflict styles that depend on the 
level of concern that is competing, reflecting individuals who focus on resource distribution dominance; 
Collaborating, describes individuals who seek to maximize mutual benefits and seek new value opportunities; 
accommodating, relating to individuals who focus on the separation of differences; And avoiding, describes 
individuals who withdraw from the conflict and hope not to deal with others. These approaches have been tested 
in various fields of research from clinical psychology to information systems project management.  
From the economic context, game theory ensures that people will behave along the two poles of an eczema 
competitive called “zero sum game” to a cooperative (e.g. collaboration) called “non zero sum game.’ 
Concerning the bargaining situation, in a study, more than 1600 global executives, Shell (2001) found that 
competition and collaboration orientation was found in many trading environments where people were actively 
involved in the bargaining process.  
From a behavioral perspective, individuals behave depending on the structure of their preferences which is 
an aggregate of the advantages of self and others. Individuals are called collaborative if they support increasing 
self-worth and value for others, and the individual is called competitive when the individual seeks to expand its 
ownership and hinders others from extending their ownership.  
Negotiation is a process caused by parties with conflicting preferences exchanging information in the hope 
of reaching an agreement. This requires the parties to work together to build solutions and compete to secure the 
distribution of resources (Chen, 2010 Concession (concession) could be a development made by one arbitrator as 
a greatness of the distinction between the proposed final-offer (Vetchera, 2007).The movement is evaluated 
based on the last offer, and can be classified according to: 
a. Integrative concession or win-win, allowing both parties to increase their value based on the last offer. The 
idea of integrative movement is based on activities that allow for profit through value creation. 
b. Distributive concession or win-lose, is associated with an increase in value for one side but a decline for the 
other. Distributive concessions are the norm or rule expected by negotiators, whose benefits to one party are 
harm to the other. 
Distributive bargaining usually consists of 5 stages: 1) each side prepares the negotiation by determining the 
target and its resistance and the target and resistance of the opponent. The target point is the best realistically 
achievable result, while the resistance point is the lowest point of the agreement is not reached and will use the 
best alternative that can be done to negotiate for example filing a court, 2) in the second stage, each party defines 
the issues and Usually make the first offer or send a proposal, 3) The negotiating parties exchange information 
about their position and the arguments in favor of the position, 4) They bargain for compromise by reviewing 
and making a deal, 5) each party executing the agreement negotiation. 
 
2.4. Game theory 
Game theory is a part of science related to decision-making when two or more parties are in a state of 
competition or conflict. The competing parties are assumed to be rational and intelligent. This means that each 
party will adopt a rational strategy of action to win the competition and each party also knows the strategy of the 
other party. Game theory can explain a well-known paradox, namely how people can work together in society 
when them tends to try to be a winner.Game model is a fundamental static model (fundamentally static model) 
that is more focused on the outcomes than the process. This model assumes that the number and identity of the 
player is fixed and known, the player is very rational, the alternatives and functions of the utility are fixed and 
unknown, the communication only exists in the model and does not affect either the form or content of payoff 
matrix (Huatlim, L & I Banbasat, 1992).  
In this theory, two conflicting decision makers know or at least have information about their behavior and 
know the value of the game. In addition, as a game or a competition, a player will always position himself as the 
party to win the game. Therefore, player I is positioned as a player who will maximize his victory, and player II 
is positioned as a player who will minimize defeat. Rationally, each player will react to choose the most 
profitable strategy. If one chooses a lucrative alternative strategy, then so does his opponent. In this case, the 
decision makers know the strategy to be taken by the opponent, as well as the possible value of the decision or 
payoff for each strategy.  
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Game theory can be classified by 1) number of players, (2) Game value, and (3) Game Strategy. Based on 
the number of players, at least two people or two groups, so this theory distinguishes the type of game into two 
person games and n person games. In practice, game competition can be performed by a company when it comes 
to issuing new products, product pricing, or other policy determinations that will make competitors or other 
companies react. From the player’s point of view, in this theory, the player’s value may be the same or may be 
different for each chosen strategy. If the player’s game value that maximizes victory equals the player’s value 
that minimizes defeat, then the game is known as the zero sum game value. Conversely, if the game value 
between two players is different, then the game is known as a non-zero sum game value. From the strategy side 
of the game, selected by the player. If the game value contains a saddle point or horse saddle that causes the 
maximum game value, the player who will win the game equals the minimum value of the player who will 
minimize the game. Therefore, the strategy to be chosen is pure strategy games (pure strategy games). 
Conversely, if the value of the game does not contain a horse saddle point that causes the two players may not 
have the same value, then the strategy game that will be selected is a mixed strategy game (mixed strategy 
games). 
a. Prisoner’s Dilemma 
In the game of two people, it can happen the value of a player's victory is different from the value of the 
opponent's defeat. The situation where the winning player score is not equal to the player's losing score in the 
game matrix, the total game value is not equal to zero so this type of game is called a two-person game with a 
non-zero sum game.  
John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (1944), and A.W. Tucker (1950) introduces the term prisoner’s 
dilemma as part of game theory and is more generally part of the rational choice theory. This dilemma is not a 
zero sum game that leads to balance. On the contrary, it often produces things far from expectations.  
The prisoner's dilemma is shaped like a story. There are two suspected crimes interrogated separately. If 
one of them confessed to doing evil while the other did not confess, who claimed to be released while the non-
admitted were punished severely.   If they both confess, then they are both punished. On the contrary, when both 
are in unison, both are punished lightly. In the case of the classic prisoners' detention dilemma, it was described 
that the police arrested two suspects of a criminal case. They were interrogated separately, and there was no 
communication between them. Since the evidence is not enough, the police give them two options to deny or 
acknowledge their involvement. If both deny, then A and B will be sentenced to 1 year imprisonment. If A 
denies and B confesses, then A will be rewarded 10 years in prison, and B is free. If A confesses and B denies, 
then A is free and B gets a 10-year sentence. If both confess, each will be rewarded 10 years. Payoff of this case 
can be seen in the following table: 
Table 1. The payoff matrix of prisoner's dilemma games 
Strategy Prisoners B 
Defection Cooperation 
Prisoners  A Defection -1, -1 -10,0 
 Cooperation 0, -10 -8. -8 
For player A, if B denies, A will choose to confess (0> -1), and if B confesses, A will still choose to confess 
(-8> -10). Thus, for A “confess” is the dominant strategy, because whatever strategy B chooses, the “confessing” 
payoff for A is always higher than other A strategy payoffs. For B, if A denies, B will choose to confess (0> -1), 
and if A confesses, B will still choose to confess (-8> -10). Thus, for B “to confess” is the dominant strategy, 
because whatever strategy A chooses, payoff “confess” to B is always higher than other B strategy payoffs. 
Therefore, the outcome claimed to be the best opinion for both suspects.  
Several studies have tried to see how the influence of communication media on interaction between 
individuals. Many studies have compared different aspects of social interaction and communication in the media. 
Media wealth affects perceptions in virtual work teams. Cognitive and certain media styles contribute to the 
commitment of the virtual work team and telework. Some hypothesis proposed in this research is 1) Negotiators 
who use video presentation will tend to use a cooperative approach rather than a negotiator using a web blog 
(leaner media), 2) Negotiators who use web blogs tend to use a competitive approach rather than a negotiator 
who uses video presentations, 3) Co-operative negotiators tend to use integrative concessions rather than 
distributive concessions, 4) Competitive negotiators tend to use distributive concessions rather than integrative 
concessions, 5) The distributive concession will provide the lower joint gains, 6) An integrative concession will 
provide maximum joint gains 
 
3. Research methods 
3.1. Method, procedures and participants  
This study uses an experimental design to explain the tendencies of collaboration and competition by using 
Prisoner's Dilemma Games. The participants are students from management programs at two universities in 
Indonesia.  
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The dependent variable in this experiment is the outcomes represented in the form of the maximum payoff 
agreed by both negotiating parties. The dependent variable is a variable that is explained or influenced by an 
independent variable. Measurement of this variable is done by giving manipulation on the independent variable. 
To find out if the participant tends to use a cooperative or competitive negotiation approach tested by solving 
cases in the game's prisoner's dilemma and to find out if the participant tends to take an integrative or distributive 
negotiation concession then the participant is asked to negotiate the case in the prisoner's dilemma game. 
The experimental design used in this research is between-within-subject with 2 x 2 x 2 factorial design, 
because there are two approaches to negotiation (cooperative and competitive), 2 negotiation concessions 
(integrative and distributive) and there are 2 media used (video presentation And web blogs), so there will be 8 
experimental groups.  
This research was conducted with 2 experimental stages. In the first stage of the experiment, the 
participants were randomly divided into 3 large groups: participants who used web blogs and participant groups 
using video presentation media and control groups, the group that did the first experiment without using video 
presentation media and web blog media. The three groups of participants will complete six kinds of prisoner’s 
prisoner game.  
In the second stage, each group will get the next treatment. Participants are divided into small groups of 
between two people each, and each pair of the group will settle the case of negotiation. Negotiations between 
couples for the experimental group (video presentations and web blogs) were conducted through electronic mail 
communication media and for the control group were conducted by a direct face-to-face method. This is to 
determine whether participants from cooperative and competitive groups will tend to take distributive 
negotiation concessions or integrative concessions.  
Prior to the experiment, the instrument of research is first tested through pilot experiment, to initial 
investigation conducted with the main objective to test the readiness of the experimental instrument so as to 
reduce the weaknesses that may arise due to the instruction and tasks on the research instrument (Gould, 2001). 
The pilot test results are then used as inputs in developing the final research instrument to be tested in the real 
experiment.  
Participants are S1 students who have filled out the willingness sheet to follow the experiment. The 
participants of this study were randomly divided into 3 groups: experimental groups (using video presentation 
media and groups using web blogs), and control groups. After the randomization process, participants are asked 
to do the whole game (games) provided. Randomization is intended to improve internal validity. In addition to 
randomization problems, Cooper and Chindler (2006) stated that in order to improve internal validity capability, 
experimental design should be considered in the form of history, maturity, instrumentation, experimental 
mortality, and selection.  
Participants receive referral guidance in the form of general instructions given. In the experimental process, 
participants are asked not to discuss each other's decision with other participants except in the case of negotiation 
and only allowed with each negotiating partner. Any information provided by the participants kept confidentially.  
The first experiment used four types of manipulation: 1) six cases of prisoners 'prisoner games displayed via 
web blog, 2) six cases of prisoners' prison games displayed via video presentation, 3) one case of negotiation 
displayed via web blog, and 4) one case of negotiation displayed via presentation Videos.  
Each participant will complete 2 experimental stages. The first experiment contained a case of a prisoner's 
dilemma game and a second experiment containing one case of negotiation. The estimated time for the case in 
the first experiment was 3 to 4 minutes, so the total time required for the first experiment for each treatment 
group was 18 to 20 minutes. In the second experiment, the estimated time is 15 minutes, so the total time 
required to complete the experiment is 35 minutes. This condition is intended to avoid the effects of boredom 
and fatigue when participants too long to follow the experiment.  
The completed experimental stage generates a number of observational data in the form of experimental 
forms. The forms are subsequently collected and recaptured in the MS Excel application according to the type of 
treatment being experimented. Recapitulation results are then used as a basis for conducting statistical testing 
and discussion. 
 
4. Analysis and result 
The experimental results of 22 participants (44 percent) using presentation videos tend to take a cooperative 
negotiation approach and 5 participants (10 percent) tend to take a competitive approach. For participants using 
web blogs, as many as 19 people (39 percent) tend to take a cooperative approach and 4 participants (8 percent) 
tend to take a competitive approach. Of the 50 participants, 41 (82 percent) tend to be cooperative and the 
remaining 9 participants (18 percent) tend to be competitive. Thus, it can be argued that participants of the 
experimental group tend to be cooperative rather than competitive. 
In the experimental results of 27 participants using presentation videos, 19 participants (38 percent) took an 
integrative cooperative approach, 4 participants (8 percent) took a cooperative approach, 2 participants (4 
European Journal of Business and Management                                                                                                                               www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1905 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2839 (Online) 
Vol.13, No.15, 2021 
 
29 
percent) took an integrative competitive approach and 3 participants (6 percent). Take a distributive competitive 
approach. For participants using a web blog, 13 participants (26 percent) took an integrative cooperative 
approach, 6 participants (12 percent) took a distributive cooperative approach, 1 participant took an integrative 
competitive approach and 3 participants (6 percent) took a distributive competitive approach.  
The results of the control group experiment were 14 participants (64 percent) tended to take a cooperative 
negotiation approach and only 8 participants (36 percent) tended to take a competitive approach. Of the 22 
participants in the control group, 13 participants (59 percent) took an integrative cooperative approach, 1 
participant (5 percent) tended to take a distributive cooperative approach, 2 participants (9 percent) tended to 
take an integrative competitive approach and 6 participants (27 percent) Competitive distributive.  
To find out whether there is a correlation between the medium used and the tendency of participants to take 
a cooperative or competition attitude, a chi-square test is performed. Test results maintain that Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) is 0.918. The value is greater than 0.05. Thus it can be concluded that Ho accepted or no relationship 
media use with the approach of negotiation. This means that media has nothing to do with participants' tendency 
to make cooperative decisions or the tendency of participants to make competitive decisions. Thus hypothesis 1 
and hypothesis 2 in this study were rejected.  
This finding is in contrast to findings from Gettinger et al (2012) which show that information presentation 
influences the negotiation process. The results show that negotiators who gain access to information in the form 
of graphs have more integrative behavior in the negotiation than the negotiators who have access to the same 
information but presented in tabular form.  
Referring to the explanation of media wealth theory, the wealth of communication media is based on the 
media's ability to convey information. Previous studies that have compared the impact of the use of 
communication media have found results that media can influence the nature of communication, but certain 
effects depend on the type of task. For some types of tasks, there is no difference due to media usage, but for 
other tasks, there is a dramatic difference.  
Testing of hypothesis 3 san 4 is Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) is 0.014. The value is less than 0.05. Thus it can be 
concluded that Ho is rejected or there is a relationship approach negotiation with the negotiation concession. 
This means that negotiation concessions are influenced by cooperative or competitive negotiation approaches 
taken by participants. Thus hypothesis 3 and hypothesis 4 in this study are accepted.  
Negotiation is a cognitive decision-making process that involves consideration of the object in question and 
demands the determination of acceptable behavior by interested parties. Negotiation requires a good cognitive 
structure that is based on the experience of the negotiator (Pinkley, 1990).  
Individuals behave depending on their preference structure which is an aggregate of self-gain and others. 
Individuals are called collaborative if they support increasing self-worth and value for others. Individuals are 
called competitive when individuals seek to expand their holdings and discourage others from expanding their 
holdings. Parties working together to build solutions and compete for securing the distribution of resources will 
take action called concessions. Such concessions may be integrative concessions based on activities that enable 
profitability through value creation and distributive concessions where benefits to one party are harm to the other. 
Thus, this argument can support the evidence from the statistical tests for hypothesis 3 and hypothesis 4 in this 
study that the negotiation approach relates to a negotiation concession. Cooperative negotiators tend to use 
integrative concessions, and competitive negotiators tend to use distributive concessions.  
For testing hypotheses 5 and 6 it is seen that Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) is 0.040. The value is less than 0.05. 
Thus it can be concluded that Ho is rejected or there is a concession negotiation relationship with joint gains 
(outcomes). This means that the negotiating concessions affect the joint gains (outcomes) obtained from the 
negotiation process. Thus hypothesis 5 and hypothesis 6 in this study are accepted.  
Win-lose orientation is contrary to win-win orientation, defined as the belief that negotiation is the process 
of finding the maximum solution for the sake of one party. A number of studies have found out that win-lose 
orientation influences bargaining behavior and has an effect on achieving optimal outcomes (Larrick and Blount, 
1997).  
Some research on social dilemmas lend support that individualists can work together if they get a 
cooperative signal from their negotiating opponents. These studies found evidence that individualists responded 
to cooperative signals and took a strategy toward tit-for-tat. Schei, et.al, (2011) contends that by expanding these 
reasons toward blended dyads in arrangements, cooperators can give integrator agreeable signals) that energize 
individualists to coöperate (integrator behavior) instead of competition (distributive behavior). Thus, this 
argument can support statistical test evidence for hypothesis 5 and hypothesis 6 in this study.  
The result of testing to the control group is the value of Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of 0.057. This value is 
greater than the value of p value 0.05 (0.057> 0.05), it can be concluded that Ho is accepted, meaning that there 
is no difference in negotiation approach (cooperative and competitive tendencies) in the experimental class 
participants and control class participants. Whether participants are informed of a prisoner's dilemma game 
dilemma from video presentation media, web blog media or reading on paper (without electronic communication 
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media) does not affect their decision to act cooperatively or competitively. This means that participants' 
tendencies for cooperative and competitive are not influenced by the medium of communication. The results of 
hypothesis testing 1 to 6 can be summarized in the table below: 
Table 2. Summary of hypothesis testing results 
Hypothesis  Accepted 
Hypothesis 1 Negotiators who use video presentation       will tend to use a cooperative 
approach rather than a negotiator using a web blog (leaner media). 
- 
Hypothesis 2 Negotiators who use web blogs tend to use a competitive approach rather than a 
negotiator who uses video presentations. 
- 
Hypothesis 3 Co-operative negotiators tend to use integrative concessions rather than 
distributive concessions, 
√ 
Hypothesis 4 Competitive negotiators tend to use a distributive concession rather than an 
integrative concession. 
√ 
Hypothesis 5 The distributive concession will provide the lower joint gains. √ 
Hypothesis 6 H6: An integrative concession will provide maximum joint gains √ 
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
Compared to face-to-face communication, the main weakness of computer-mediated communications (CMC) is 
the lack of visual and audio cues (Vrasidas and Mclsaac, 2000). Body language or movement often conveys 
importance. Studies on computer based communication mostly use text-based CMC. The difference with this 
research is that the development of information technology led to communication with information technology 
(ITC) also experienced rapid development. These developments cause the web blog is no longer just a collection 
of posts or links that are stored by the owner of the blog, but already provides other services such as services to 
upload photos or video. Thus there is virtually no difference between communication media with CMC and face-
to-face communication. In this study participants can read cases of prisoner game prisoners then understand as 
well as the understanding of participants who use video presentations and control group participants who read 
the text of cases of prisoners' dilemma on paper.  
Bichieri et al (2007) found evidence that the impact of communication varied according to the richness of 
the communication channel. Videoconference produces very close cooperation with face-to-face communication, 
while text-based communication results in less substantive cooperation. Generally, the impact of CMC 
approaches the impact of face to face communication because CMC is a communication channel that reproduces 
the face to face communication features.  
The statistical evidence for hypothesis 5 and hypothesis 6 obtained in this study is not in line with the 
Buchieri et al (2007) study. In the 2nd experiment for the control class and the experimental class, there was no 
difference in the outcome of the negotiation. The two groups gave the same result that the negotiation 
concessions had an effect on the joint payoff. For the control group, negotiations were conducted with face-to-
face media, while for the experimental group negotiations were conducted with electronic mail. Thus it can be 
concluded that text-based communication or negotiation (email) and face to face negotiation do not affect the 
outcome of a negotiation.  
This study finds evidence that there is no relationship between media use and the negotiated approach. The 
use of electronic collaboration media of video presentations and web blogs is not related to the tendency of 
participants to make cooperative or competitive decisions. Thus there is not enough evidence to accept 
hypothesis 1 that negotiators using presentation video (richer media) will tend to use a cooperative approach. 
Similarly, with hypothesis 2, there is not enough evidence to accept the hypothesis that negotiators using web 
blogs (leaner media) will tend to use a competitive approach.  
There is ample evidence to accept the hypothesis that the negotiation approach affects negotiation 
concessions. Cooperative negotiators will tend to use integrative concessions rather than distributive concessions, 
and competitive negotiators will tend to use distributive concessions rather than integrative concessions.  
There is sufficient evidence to accept the hypothesis that negotiation concessions affect the joint payoff. 
The integrative concession will provide the maximum joint gains and the distributive concessions will provide 
lower joint gains. This is because distributive concessions lead to benefits on the one hand and cause losses on 
the other, so negotiators with distributive concessions tend to take maximum advantage for their side and cause 
lower joint gains. 
 
6. Implication, limitation and future research direction 
This study contains at least three implications of research, namely conceptual implications, methodologies and 
managerial. Conceptually, this research has successfully approached the Media richness Theory by using the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma Game. Thus, the empirical results of this study will further enrich the exploration of Media 
Richness Theory which has been using perspective and approaches different from that done in this research.  
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This research can at least be used as one of the foundations in developing behavioral research in the field of 
Management Information System including the research methodology used. Although the research methodology 
developed in this study is still not perfect, at least able to provide new colors in the field of behavioral research 
in the field of Management Information Systems.  
In addition to the above two implications, this study also contains managerial implications. From the 
managerial side, the results of this research are at least able to provide policy contribution for practitioners who 
very often do business negotiations in the area of information systems and other business areas.  
This study contains several limitations. The research model still has limitations in explaining the behavior 
of negotiators in making decisions, especially on negotiations with computer media. In fact, the use of computer 
media in negotiations encounters a number of geographic constraints, ie distance and time differences which 
may greatly affect the outcome of negotiations under different conditions of the study.  
Another limitation is the use of cases of prisoners' dilemma of only 6 cases. The use of these may be true to 
the trend of negotiator behavior. More cases need to be added so that conclusions can be taken to see the 
tendency of negotiators to be cooperative and competitive can be more meaningful.   
Suggestions for future research that can be submitted authors are; a) For academics and researchers. The 
empirical findings in this study have shown that the complexity of negotiator behavior can not be explained 
simply by using only one perspective or approach. So for future research, researchers need to combine with some 
other perspectives and with other methodologies to obtain better research results in explaining the behavior of 
negotiators in making decisions, especially for negotiated cases mediated by electronic or computer media, b) 
For practitioners, an understanding of the psychological aspects of the negotiation process is essential to improve 
the quality of the decisions taken. Understanding of conditions as in the game of the prisoner's dilemma is also 
very good to understand the decisions taken can provide maximum benefits for the negotiating parties.  
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